Date Filed: November 02, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(Guideline timelines on the Spencer Hill Applications and on all applications over 1 MW.) The Spencer Hill Applications were submitted through PowerClerk on January 10, 2024. The Company gave notice that a feasibility study was required on July 18, 2024 (190 days later; the Guidelines' Executive Summary provides 15 Business Days for initial review); delivered the feasibility study on February 6, 2025 (185 days after the signed agreement and $7,500 fee were returned on August 5, 2024; the agreement's Exhibit B states a duration of 30 Business Days); gave notice on September 23, 2024 that a Distribution System Impact Study was required and received the executed agreement and $85,000 fee on September 25, 2024; and has delivered no system impact study, transmission study, facilities study, or Interconnection Agreement as of the date of these interrogatories. (a) For each of those steps, state the Guideline or study-agreement timeline the Company contends applied, the date it expired, the reason the step was not completed within it, and whether the Company gave the applicant the notice, explanation, and estimated completion date that Section 5.1 of the Guidelines requires when a deadline is missed, with the date of each such notice. (b) For every application over 1 MW received since January 1, 2020, state in native format the elapsed days from application to the Company's first substantive notice, from feasibility study agreement to feasibility study delivery, and from system impact study agreement to system impact study delivery, and the number and percentage of applications for which each Guideline timeline was met. (c) Identify the person(s) by title responsible in 2024, 2025, and 2026 for monitoring compliance with the Guideline timelines for applications over 1 MW, and each report of non-compliance made to Company management or the Authority.

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. The requested information regarding specific interconnection applications and the personnel who administered those applications is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19, to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute, administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence."

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's request pertains to specific interconnection applications and the personnel who administered those applications, which is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994). As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution

of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has not been shown to be material or relevant would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.