Date Filed: November 03, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(Institutional and pension-fund ownership of Eversource Energy.) The Company has represented to the United States District Court (No. 3:26-cv-01277, ECF 46-3) that the State Board of Administration of Florida Retirement System holds 312,059 Eversource Energy shares, drawn from that fund's Form 13F-HR. State: (a) for each of the fifty largest holders of Eversource Energy common shares as of the most recent date for which the Company or Eversource Energy has data, the holder, the number of shares, and whether the holder is a public or private pension fund, an index fund, an actively managed fund, an insurance company, or other; (b) the aggregate percentage of Eversource Energy's shares held by public pension funds, and the source; (c) the actuarial assumed rate of return of each public pension fund among those holders of which the Company or its ROE witness is aware, and the assumed long-term equity return used in Eversource Energy's own pension plans; (d) whether the Company or its ROE witness considered that the return investors require of Eversource Energy is evidenced by the return assumptions of the pension funds that hold it, and if not, why not; and (e) each service (e.g., Broadridge, DTC, NOBO lists, 13F compilations) through which Eversource Energy identifies its beneficial holders, and the date of the most recent such list.

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. Allco's request concerning the lawsuit that it filed against the Company is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19 to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision. Moreover, Allco's request is an improper effort to use this rate case proceeding to obtain discovery for purposes of that lawsuit.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute, administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide

the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's request concerning the lawsuit that it filed against the Company is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994). As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has not been shown to be material or relevant would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory

timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.