Date Filed: November 02, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(The Company's own system peaks.) For each calendar year 2016 through 2025, state in native format: (a) the date, hour, and megawatts of the Company's annual system peak load (non-coincident), and of its monthly system peak load for each month, as measured at the Company's delivery points or as otherwise determined by the Company; (b) the three-year average peak-demand hour for each month that the Company or its affiliates use for planning, rate design, or cost allocation, and the document in which it appears; (c) the peak-load values the Company reported in each annual Forecast of Loads and Resources filed with the Connecticut Siting Council for those years [Tom: confirm the statutory cite for the annual Forecast of Loads and Resources, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50r], reconciled to the values in (a) and to the ISO-New England values in Q-ALLCO-218(b); (d) whether the Company's reported peak loads are gross of, or net of, distributed generation that is not separately metered (behind-the-meter generation) and distributed generation that is separately metered but treated as a load reducer, and the method by which any adjustment is made; and (e) the hourly load of the Company's Metering Domain (8,760 hours), and the hourly load of the Standard Service and Last Resort Service Load Assets, for the Test Year, as reported to ISO-New England and after any resettlement.

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. The overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale energy market and the manner in which the electric system operates, is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19 to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute, administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide

the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale energy market and the manner in which the electric system operates is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994)[1]. As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

[1] PURA has also previously ruled that interrogatories must pertain to the evidence and testimony submitted by a witness in the proceeding. See, Ruling on Motion No. 73, Docket No. 23-11-02, Application of Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation and The Southern Connecticut Gas Company to Amend Their Rate Schedules, April 3, 2024, citing, General Statutes § 4-177c(a)(2); Motion Ruling Nos. 15 and 17, Jan. 2, 2009, Docket No. 08-07-15, Petition of the Office of Consumer Counsel for Enforcement of Quality of Service Standards for The Southern New England Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T Connecticut.

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has not been shown to be material or relevant would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.