Date Filed: November 02, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(Monthly network load used for RNS and LNS billing.) For each month of calendar years 2020 through 2025 and 2026 to date, state in native format: (a) the date and hour of the monthly peak of the local network (or other load aggregation) on which the Company's Regional Network Service charge under the ISO-New England Transmission, Markets and Services Tariff is determined, and the tariff provision that defines that peak; (b) the Company's network load (MW) at that hour as billed for Regional Network Service, and the corresponding value billed for Local Network Service and for any transmission adjustment charge; (c) the Regional Network Service rate ($/kW-month or $/kW-year) applied in that month and the resulting monthly charge in dollars, separately for Regional Network Service, Local Network Service, and each other ISO-New England or Eversource transmission charge billed on a peak-load determinant; (d) the identity of the entity that computes the monthly network load (the Company, Eversource Energy Service Company, ISO-New England, or another) and the data from which it is computed; and (e) produce the monthly Regional Network Service and Local Network Service invoices or settlement statements for the Test Year and the workpapers that derive the billing determinant.

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. The requested information concerning the mechanics of the wholesale generation market and the manner in which the electric system operates, as well as an overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning transmission cost categories, is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19 to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute, administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide

the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale generation market and the manner in which the electric system operates, as well as an overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning transmission cost categories, is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994). As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has not been shown to be material or relevant would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory

timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.

Date Filed: November 02, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(Annual coincident peak contribution and capacity requirements.) For each calendar year 2020 through 2025, state in native format: (a) the date and hour of the ISO-New England system-wide annual peak load used to determine capacity requirements for the following Capacity Commitment Period, and the system-wide peak load (MW) at that hour; (b) the total load of the Company's Metering Domain at that hour as reported by the Company to ISO-New England, and the load at that hour of each Load Asset in the Metering Domain, identified by load-serving entity category (Standard Service, Last Resort Service, each competitive supplier, which may be anonymized other than by category); (c) the Capacity Load Obligation (MW) of the Standard Service and Last Resort Service Load Assets for each Capacity Commitment Period from 2021–2022 through 2026–2027, the Forward Capacity Market clearing price applicable to the Connecticut load zone or Rest-of-Pool for each period, and the capacity cost ($) embedded in the Standard Service and Last Resort Service rates for each period; (d) whether the Company, as the entity that procures Standard Service and Last Resort Service supply, receives from its wholesale suppliers any accounting of the capacity cost component of their bids, and if so produce it for the most recent solicitation; and (e) if the Company contends that it does not possess the values in (a) through (c), identify the person at Eversource Energy Service Company or elsewhere who reports Metering Domain loads to ISO-New England and who receives the Capacity Load Obligation reports, and produce the reports for the Test Year.

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. The overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale energy market and the manner in which the electric system operates, is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19 to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute, administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial

precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale energy market and the manner in which the electric system operates is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994). As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has

not been shown to be material or relevant would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.

Date Filed: November 02, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(The Company's own system peaks.) For each calendar year 2016 through 2025, state in native format: (a) the date, hour, and megawatts of the Company's annual system peak load (non-coincident), and of its monthly system peak load for each month, as measured at the Company's delivery points or as otherwise determined by the Company; (b) the three-year average peak-demand hour for each month that the Company or its affiliates use for planning, rate design, or cost allocation, and the document in which it appears; (c) the peak-load values the Company reported in each annual Forecast of Loads and Resources filed with the Connecticut Siting Council for those years [Tom: confirm the statutory cite for the annual Forecast of Loads and Resources, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-50r], reconciled to the values in (a) and to the ISO-New England values in Q-ALLCO-218(b); (d) whether the Company's reported peak loads are gross of, or net of, distributed generation that is not separately metered (behind-the-meter generation) and distributed generation that is separately metered but treated as a load reducer, and the method by which any adjustment is made; and (e) the hourly load of the Company's Metering Domain (8,760 hours), and the hourly load of the Standard Service and Last Resort Service Load Assets, for the Test Year, as reported to ISO-New England and after any resettlement.

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. The overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale energy market and the manner in which the electric system operates, is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19 to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute, administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide

the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale energy market and the manner in which the electric system operates is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994)[1]. As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

[1] PURA has also previously ruled that interrogatories must pertain to the evidence and testimony submitted by a witness in the proceeding. See, Ruling on Motion No. 73, Docket No. 23-11-02, Application of Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation and The Southern Connecticut Gas Company to Amend Their Rate Schedules, April 3, 2024, citing, General Statutes § 4-177c(a)(2); Motion Ruling Nos. 15 and 17, Jan. 2, 2009, Docket No. 08-07-15, Petition of the Office of Consumer Counsel for Enforcement of Quality of Service Standards for The Southern New England Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T Connecticut.

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has not been shown to be material or relevant would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.

Date Filed: November 02, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(Distributed generation output at the Company's peaks — follow-up to ALLCO-088, Attachment 1, and Q-ALLCO-185.) ALLCO-088, Attachment 1, estimates the Company's distributed solar output at the ISO-New England system-wide monthly peak hour. State in native format, for each month of 2020 through 2025: (a) the same estimate at the hour of the Company's monthly network-load peak identified in Q-ALLCO-217(a) and at the hour of the Company's own monthly system peak identified in Q-ALLCO-219(a); (b) the estimated output at the ISO-New England annual peak hour identified in Q-ALLCO-218(a); (c) the installed capacity (MW AC) of distributed generation under five megawatts in the Company's service territory assumed for each month, stated separately for generation that is behind a customer meter and generation that is separately metered, and reconciled to the 75,727 facilities and 742.5 MW reported in ALLCO-095; (d) the capacity factor or production profile applied to that installed capacity for each peak hour and its source (including any ISO-New England behind-the-meter photovoltaic forecast, PVWatts or PVsyst profile, or metered production data from the Company's own production meters), and why Attachment 1 reports zero output at the 18:00 and 19:00 peak hours of May through September in several years; and (e) whether the Company has, for any purpose, estimated the reduction in Regional Network Service or Local Network Service charges, or in Capacity Load Obligation, attributable to distributed generation in its service territory in any year since 2016, and if so produce each such estimate (ALLCO-088(e) answered only that the Company has not "expressly" done so; state whether it has done so in any other manner, including in load forecasts that net out behind-the-meter generation).

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. The overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale energy market and the manner in which the electric system operates, is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19 to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute,

administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale energy market and the manner in which the electric system operates is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994)[1]. As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

[1] PURA has also previously ruled that interrogatories must pertain to the evidence and testimony submitted by a witness in the proceeding. See, Ruling on Motion No. 73, Docket No. 23-11-02, Application of Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation and The Southern Connecticut Gas Company to Amend Their Rate Schedules, April 3, 2024, citing,

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has not been shown to be material or relevant would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.

General Statutes § 4-177c(a)(2); Motion Ruling Nos. 15 and 17, Jan. 2, 2009, Docket No. 08-07-15, Petition of the Office of Consumer Counsel for Enforcement of Quality of Service Standards for The Southern New England Telephone Company d/b/a AT&T Connecticut.

Date Filed: November 02, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(Pass-through of peak-based charges to retail customers.) State: (a) the retail rate component(s) through which the Company recovers Regional Network Service, Local Network Service, and other ISO-New England transmission charges billed on peak-load determinants (identify by tariff name and the schedule or exhibit in this docket, or in the most recent transmission rate adjustment proceeding, that sets the rate), and the total dollars so recovered in each calendar year 2020 through 2025; (b) the retail rate component(s) through which capacity costs for Standard Service and Last Resort Service are recovered, and the total dollars so recovered in each of those years; (c) for each of those years, the dollar amount by which the charges in (a) and (b) would have been reduced for each 100 MW of load reduction at the applicable monthly network peaks and at the ISO-New England annual peak hour, respectively, showing the calculation; (d) whether the Company agrees that, because ISO-New England procures capacity against a forecast peak and allocates capacity costs by actual coincident peak contribution, a reduction in a load-serving entity's coincident peak contribution reduces its Capacity Load Obligation by more than the reduction in load whenever cleared capacity exceeds the actual peak, and if it disagrees, explain; and (e) whether the Company has ever presented to the Authority, in this or any prior docket, a quantification of the transmission and capacity cost reductions attributable to distributed generation in its service territory, and if so identify it by docket, date, and exhibit.

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. The requested information concerning the mechanics of the wholesale generation market, as well as an overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning transmission cost categories, is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19 to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute, administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a

material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's request concerning the mechanics of the wholesale generation market, as well as an overly broad, unduly burdensome, and repetitive request concerning transmission cost categories, is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994). As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has

not been shown to be material or relevant would imposse uneccesary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.

Date Filed: November 02, 2026

Witness: Counsel
Request from: ALLCO

Question:

(Load-reducer treatment and the Company's objections.) The Company has objected that the effect of distributed generation on peaks and load obligations is "outside the scope of this rate case proceeding" (ALLCO-088) while stating that there is "no cost-benefit asymmetry" in its treatment of projects under five megawatts as load reducers (ALLCO-098) and proposing interconnection, hosting-capacity, and grid-modernization investments for recovery in this docket. State: (a) each benefit to distribution customers that the Company contends results from treating distributed generation under five megawatts as load reducers rather than registering it as generation with ISO-New England, and the data, if any, on which the Company relies for each; (b) whether any of the values requested in Q-ALLCO-217 through Q-ALLCO-221 were considered by the Company in preparing the benefit-cost analyses, if any, supporting the interconnection and hosting-capacity investments proposed in this docket, and if so identify where; and (c) whether the Company contends that the Authority may evaluate the prudence and reasonableness of those investments without data on the effect of the resources they interconnect on the transmission and capacity charges its customers pay, and if so the basis for that contention.

Response:

Eversource objects to this request. The repetitive request concerning load reducer status is not probative of any material or disputed issue relevant to the Company's application in this proceeding, which PURA is conducting as a general distribution rate proceeding pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-19 to amend the Company's base-rate schedules. Absent such a connection, the requested information is not reasonably calculated to advance the evidentiary record upon which PURA must base its decision.

The purpose of discovery is to provide PURA, the parties, and intervenors with access to relevant, probative information necessary to develop a complete and accurate record -- not to allow repetitive or irrelevant requests that divert time and resources from that objective. By statute, administrative agencies must exclude "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a). Connecticut judicial precedent explains that evidence is relevant only if it has a tendency to establish the existence of a material fact. United Technologies Corp. v Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 72 Conn. App. 212, 229 (2002). Discovery must advance the efficiency of the proceeding and provide the factual foundation upon which an agency decision may rely. Therefore, a party is required to produce discovery documents only if they are "material and necessary to [an] action." Dotson v.

Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV106012742S, 2011 WL 1021745, (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2011) (citing, Berger v. Cuomo, 230 Conn. 1, 7 (1994)); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-177c(a)(1) (permitting discovery of "relevant and material records, papers and documents[.]").

Additionally, discovery "does not afford an open invitation to delve into [CL&P's] affairs". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673, 681 (2002). Allco "must be able to demonstrate good faith as well as probable cause that the information sought is both material and necessary" to this rate case. Id. Practice Book § 13-2, which defines the scope of discovery, provides in relevant part that a party may only seek discovery of nonprivileged information that is "material to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . ." "It is axiomatic that [e]vidence is admissible only to prove material facts, that is to say, those facts directly in issue or those probative of matters in issue; ***evidence offered to prove other facts is immaterial***." Salmon v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 259 Conn. 288, 316 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.)

Further, discovery may not be used to conduct an unrestricted search for information. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained, a party "should not be allowed to indulge a hope that a thorough ransacking of any information and material which . . . [CL&P] may possess would turn up evidence helpful to [his] case". J. Pub. Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. at 681. Simiarly, "[i]nterrogatories should not be used to . . . permit a party to go on a fishing expedition." Mfr.'s Advert., Inc. v. Pancoast, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 668, 670 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Allco's repetitive request concerning load reducer status is not relevant to PURA's evaluation of either the Company's application as a whole or its proposed revenue requirement. Thus, the information requested in this interrogatory is not relevant or material to the Company's rate application as it does not advance the factual foundation upon which PURA's decision will rely. Office of Consumer Counsel v. Department of Public Utility Control, 44 Conn. Supp. 21, 26-27 (1994). As the information is irrelevant and immaterial, this discovery must be excluded. See General Statutes § 4-178(1); see also Conn. Agencies Regs. § 16-1-38(a).

In addition, the statutory 350-day timeframe for issuing a final decision on the Company's application, coupled with the volume of interrogatories issued, strongly weighs against devoting the time and resources of the parties and PURA to discovery that does not advance the resolution of this proceeding. Requiring the Company to collect, review, and produce information that has not been shown to be material or relevant would impose unnecessary administrative burdens and divert resources from the important issues PURA must evaluate and resolve within the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, in the interest of the orderly and efficient conduct of this proceeding, Eversource respectfully requests that this objection be sustained.