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Request from: Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

Question:

Att. 16, pp. 3-5. For the three instances where the Company's conductor was 'burnt down':

a. Describe the N-1 event that triggered the switching (i.e. what component of the distribution system failed). If possible indicate the location of the failure on the map referenced in RSR-5;
b. Provide the dates and times of the failures and subsequent overloads;
c. Provide the loading conditions on each feeder before and after the failure (i.e, for each feeder, the load on the feeder and the ratio of that load to the feeder's peak load);
d. Provide the duration of the overload conditions which necessitated switching;
e. Explain why the Company did not reconductor the ROW with higher capacity conductors after the first time the conductor was burnt down.

Response:

There were two events that caused conductor failure due to overload within the 14R31 right of way ("ROW").

A. The location of failure for Line 14R31 was a primary insulator that melted resulting in a pole fire. This insulator failure coincides with an increase in loads on the Campville 14R31 and 14R32 lines from the Bulls Bridge Substation 11M. The Bulls Bridge Substation was de-loaded on September 12th, 2013 to facilitate the installation of a mobile transformer position.

The event which occurred on July 15, 2024 was due to a tree that fell on a double circuit pole line containing both the 11M3 and 11M62 circuits. Following the tree event, the fault locations were isolated for both 11M3 and 11M62 circuits and customers were restored via the 14R31 circuit. The conductor failure on 14R31 resulted after the increase in load from customer restoration. See attachment (CD02440 – 14R31 Project Map) in RSR-5 for the location of the conductor failure.

B. The first event occurred on September 12, 2013 at 12:30 and the second event occurred on July 15, 2024 at 19:42.

C.

14R31 Load Conditions	9/12/2013	7/15/2024
Load prior to receiving additional load (amps)	90	127
Load prior to conductor failure (amps)	342	312
Summer peak load (amps)	161	155
Ratio of load prior to failure versus summer peak load	212%	201%

D. The duration of the condition for the September 12, 2013 event was 7 hours in which 3 of the 7 hours created an overload condition.

The duration of the condition for the July 15, 2024 event was 52 minutes in which the conductor failed due to overload 7 minutes after the switching occurred.

E. The overload event from September 12, 2013 was to facilitate the installation of a mobile position at Bulls Bridge 11M which required the entire substation to be de-energized. Going forward, with the mobile position installed, the load supplied from Bulls Bridge 11M would be transferred to the mobile transformer via the newly installed mobile position as opposed to transferring the load to the Campville 14R feeders. Therefore, this overload condition would not occur on the 14R31 as a result of the substation being de-energized and there was no longer a need at that time to reconductor the 14R31 overhead conductor.